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ABSTRACT
Booking.com is your one-stop shop, and among the most popular websites, for
booking travel plans. One can book flights, hotel reservations, car rentals, and even
travel attractions all on one website. But should the trademark “Booking.com” be
eligible for federal trademark protection? Should any trademark with the form
“generic.com” be eligible for federal trademark protection? This was the main issue in
the June 2020 Supreme Court decision, United States Patent and Trademark Office
v. Booking.com B.V., to which Justice Ginsburg and the majority held that
“Booking.com” is eligible for federal registration on the principal register. That
decision, as Justice Breyer argues in his dissenting opinion, was incorrectly decided.
This article will explore how trademark law disfavors awarding federal protection to
“Booking.com,” and more generally, “generic.com” marks. Booking.com opens the
door to a future anticompetitive economy where one business with a registered
“generic.com” trademark will envelop the market for which it targets.
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TRADEMARK LAW AFTER USPTO V. BOOKING.COM:
“GENERIC.COM” TAKEOVER
PAIGE MILLER

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a novice entrepreneur hopeful to share your passion of
handmade, artisan candles with the world. With today’s increasing online market,
instead of opening a brick-and-mortar store, it would be more convenient to simply
have a website where customers can look through essential oils and scents to create
their own custom candle for you to make and ship to them. You also hire employees for
marketing, customer service, finance, product fulfillment, and information technology.
Before launching your business, you meet with a website creator in which they
ask you the question you’ve anticipated most: what is the name of your website? You
want your website name to be something that explains to the consumer what you are
selling without being overly broad. The name of your website is “Candlely.com.”
A few weeks into the launch of “Candlely.com,” you receive an e-mail from
Intellectual Property Counsel of “Candles.com” threatening trademark infringement
of “Candles.com.” The e-mail says that if you do not cease all business under the name
“Candlely.com,” they will proceed with legal action. As a young entrepreneur, you don’t
have the funds to hire representation and you think it would be easier to terminate
“Candlely.com” fearing that an alternative name including anything similar to
“Candles.com” will again threaten litigation.
This hypothetical would not be a potential reality if the majority in United States
Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V. did not decide the case the way it
did.1 Unfortunately, because of this decision, the above situation will happen all too
often in the future of trademark law.
In Booking.com, the Supreme Court held that “Booking.com” “is not a generic
name to consumers”2 and “whether any given ‘generic.com’ term is generic . . . depends
on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as
a term capable of distinguishing among members of the class.” 3
Booking.com was improperly decided because the majority did not give
considerable weight to the future of trademark law after its decision. This decision is
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1 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020).
2 Id. at 2305.
3 Id. at 2307.
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detrimental for trademark law in the future because it will create an anti-competitive
market where “generic.com” trademarks will create copious monopolies.
Part II (“Background”) provides background information on trademark law and
internet domain names. Part III (“The Case”) provides details of Booking.com. This
Part will include the relevant facts, procedural history, analysis, and the majority
holding, as well as Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion. Part IV (“Analysis”) expands
upon the problems with the majority’s holding regarding the future of trademark law
and the internet. Finally, Part V (“Conclusion”) will serve as a wrap-up of previous
points and reiterate the importance of the economic consequences that will result from
this case.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Trademark Purpose & History
The main underlying principle of trademark protection “‘is that distinctive
marks—words, names, symbols, and the like—can help distinguish a particular
artisan’s goods from those of others.’”4 While trademarks protect sellers by
“designat[ing] the goods as the product of a particular trader and protect[ing] his good
will against the sale of another’s product as his,”5 it also “protect[s] the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” 6 Thus, trademark law
“‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions’ . . . for
it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items.” 7
Trademarks have “ancient origins” and existed at common law to which
trademark ownership and protection was limited to “the province of the States.” 8
However, in 1946, because Congress concluded that trademarks “desirably promote
competition and the maintenance of product quality,” it enacted the Lanham Act 9 “in
order to provide national protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign
commerce.”10 Under the Lanham Act, a trademark owner may obtain federal protection
4 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 142 (2015). See also In re Sones, 590
F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“the purpose of a trademark is to distinguish goods and to identify
the source of the goods.”) (citing In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1999)); Burris Carpet Plus, Inc. v. Burris, 785 N.W.2d 164, 173 (N.D. 2010) (A mark must “identify
the provider of the goods or services, distinguishing the user’s goods or services from the goods or
services of others in the customers’ minds.”).
5 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
6 Park’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly. Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
7 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2]
(3d ed. 1994)).
8 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed. 2017)).
9 See generally The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141.
10 Park’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193 (Other reasons for adoption of the Lanham Act included “rights to
trademarks were uncertain and subject to variation in different parts of the country” and “Congress
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through the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) who “administers a federal
registration system for trademarks.”11
There are two types of registers: the principal register and the supplemental
register, the supplemental register being available for marks that are currently
ineligible to be registered under the principal register.12 Although registering a mark
is not mandatory and “the owner of an unregistered mark may still use it in commerce
and enforce it against infringers . . . registration [on the principal register] gives
trademark owners valuable benefits.”13 These benefits include “prima facie evidence of
the validity of the registered mark”14 and “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim
of ownership” if possible infringement arises.15
Trademark owners wishing to register a trademark will file an application with
the PTO where an Attorney Examiner will determine the eligibility of the mark. 16 If
the Examining Attorney determines there are “statutory bars to registration,” 17 the
examiner might “reject the application in whole or in part, [or] request further
information” to which “the applicant can then respond to this ‘Office Action’” where the
applicant and the PTO will communicate back and forth about the mark’s eligibility. 18
If the mark is finally rejected by the PTO, “[a]n appeal may be taken to the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) from any final decision of the examiner in charge of
the registration of marks.”19 If the TTAB upholds the decision of the Examining
Attorney, the applicant may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the

determined that ‘a sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest
protection’” because trademarks “promote competition and the maintenance of product quality”).
11 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052.
12 In re Bush Bros. & Co., 884 F.2d 569, 570 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A mark that does not meet all the
requirements for registration on the Principal Register, but that is ‘capable of distinguishing the
applicant’s goods or services’ may be registered on the Supplemental Register.”); In re Bachman
Chocolate Mfg. Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. 753, 753 (T.T.A.B. 1967). In determining whether applicant’s candy
bar shape was registrable on the supplemental register, the court stated:
the shape of applicant’s candy bar is somewhat unique in design and since the
examiner has made nothing of record to show that this configuration is either so
non-distinctive as to be incapable of distinguishing or has any functional aspects,
it must be held that it is, prima facie, capable of distinguishing applicant’s goods
and, therefore, registrable on the Supplemental Register.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1091.
13 Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297 (citing Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1752).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
15 Id. § 1072; See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (“[A mark that] has been in continuous use for five
consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still in use in commerce, shall be
incontestable”).
16 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:124.50
(5th ed. 2020); see 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(f) (some of the statutory bars to registration include “deceptive
matter”, or “matter which may . . . falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols”).
18 See MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 19:124.50.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1070.
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Federal Circuit or, as an alternative, choose to “obtain review by a civil action filed in
a district court.”20
B. Spectrum of Distinctiveness
Under the Lanham Act, “federal trademark protection is available only to
‘distinctive’ marks-‘marks that serve the purpose of identifying the source of . . . goods
or services.”21 A mark is distinctive if it is “inherently distinctive” or if “it can acquire
distinctiveness over time.”22 A mark is “inherently distinctive” when “its intrinsic
nature serves to identify its particular source.”23 A mark has “acquired distinctiveness”
when “‘there is an association formed in the minds of the consumers between the mark
and the source or origin of the product.’”24 In other words, a mark with acquired
distinctiveness “might initially have been understood to describe a broad class of
potential products or services, but over time it has taken on a ‘secondary meaning’ that
links it to a particular source.”25
Trademarks are grouped into “categories of generally increasing
distinctiveness . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5)
fanciful.”26 Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks, “because of their intrinsic nature
serve[] to identify a particular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive

20 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 21:20; see 15 U.S.C § 1071; see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air
Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 673 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In an appeal to the Federal Circuit, the case
proceeds on the closed administrative record and no new evidence is permitted. In contrast, an appeal
to the district court is both an appeal and a new action, which allows the parties to request additional
relief and to submit new evidence.”).
21 Royal Palm Properties, LLC v. Pink Palm Properties, LLC, 950 F.3d 776, 782 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007)).
22 Royal Palm, 950 F.3d at 782.
23 Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 2005); see also id. (Coca-Cola
is an example of an inherently distinctive mark because it “describes only one brand of soft drink”).
24 Real Foods Pty. Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Tone
Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
25 Royal Palm, 950 F.3d at 783. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings,
Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark for a painted “highgloss red lacquer” on the “outsoles” of its footwear has acquired secondary meaning because extensive
advertising and sales demonstrate that the symbol is “uniquely associated with the Louboutin brand”);
see also Real Foods, 906 F.3d at 978 (Real Foods’ proposed descriptive mark “Corn Thins” for “popped
corn cakes” have not acquired distinctiveness because Real Foods performed small amounts of
advertising, did not have high sales, and consumers had “low brand loyalty”).
26 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). See Hickory Farms, Inc. v.
Snackmasters, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that “beef stick” and “turkey
stick” are generic because they “named . . . beef or turkey prepared and packed in stick form”); Baig
v. Coca-Cola Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 766, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that “Naturally Zero” is descriptive
because it “immediately conveys . . . that the spring water sold by Plaintiffs contains no calories or
additives”); Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014) (“POM” used in
connection with pomegranate juice beverages is suggestive because the word “POM” “requires
customers to use some additional imagination and perception to decipher the nature of Pom
Wonderful’s goods”); Omega S.A. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D. Conn. 2002) (The
mark “Omega” for watches is arbitrary because the word “omega” does not suggest time or watches);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 117 (W.D.N.Y 1989) (“Kodak trademark is perhaps
one of the strongest and most distinctive trademarks in this country, if not in the world.”).
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and are entitled to protection.”27 A descriptive mark, that “describes the product’s
features, qualities, or ingredients . . . [is] not inherently distinctive, and a showing that
the mark has acquired distinctiveness— ‘secondary meaning’—is required before
protection will be extended.”28
A generic term, one that refers to “the genus of which the particular product is a
species,” is ineligible for trademark protection.29 At common law, “neither those terms
which were generic nor those which were merely descriptive could become valid
trademarks.”30 When the Lanham Act was adopted, it “makes an important exception
with respect to those merely descriptive terms which have acquired secondary
meaning, . . . [but] it offers no such exception for generic marks.” 31 Therefore, “even
proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some ‘merely descriptive’ marks may
be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark.” 32 Due to
the ineligibility of generic terms to be registered, if a protected and registered mark
becomes generic, it will be cancelled.33 Consequently, in a situation where the “majority
of the relevant public appropriates a trademark term as the name of a product (or
service), the mark is a victim of ‘genericide’ and trademark rights generally cease.” 34
Terms that fell victim to genericide include “’aspirin,’ ‘cellophane,’ and ‘escalator.’”35
Generic names are “irretrievably in the public domain,” 36 and there are multiple
policy reasons that favor the ineligibility of trademark protection for generic names.37
The Supreme Court has stated that, “[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected
by . . . trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of
which the consuming public is deeply interested.”38 Furthermore, protection for generic
terms would create anti-competitive effects because “[a]llowing a generic term to have
trademark protection would overstep the purposes of trademark law and violate
fundamental concepts of fair competition . . . ‘[A company] cannot appropriate the
English language, and by doing so render a competitor inarticulate.’” 39 Trademarks
should not be used to “perpetuate product monopolies”; instead “trademark policies are
designed to protect consumers from being misled as to the enterprise . . . from which
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
Lane Cap. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Two
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768–69).
29 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(3).
30 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (citing Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323
(1872).
31 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
32 Id.
33 Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007); see 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
34 Freecycle, 505 F.3d at 905.
35 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 12:1. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y
1921); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d. Cir. 1936); Haughton Elevator
Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 81 (1950).
36 Henri’s Food Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir. 1987).
37 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 12:1.
38 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
39 Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1162 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Blau
Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1986)). See CES Pub. Corp. v. St.
Regis Publ’n., Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) (“To allow trademark protection for generic
terms . . . even when these have become identified with a first user, would grant the owner of the
mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe his goods as what they are.”).
27
28
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the goods or services emanate . . . and to achieve these ends in a manner consistent
with the objectives of free competition.”40
C. Importance of Consumer Perception
Because one of the main purposes of trademark law, and the Lanham Act, is to
“protect . . . the consumers of the country,” 41 how consumers perceive a trademark is
critical. McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition states that “the customer’s
state of mind is key to all trademark disputes” and “the customer’s state of mind is
paramount to determine . . . validity.” 42 Consumer perception is usually assessed
through consumer surveys that, “examin[e] the average potential consumer in the
context of the existing marketplace and exposed to the information currently available
in the marketplace.”43 Consumer surveys are used throughout trademark disputes,
including whether a mark has secondary meaning or whether false advertising is
present; however, “consumer survey[s] [are] the most definitive evidence of [a mark’s]
genericness.”44 Consumer surveys are “routinely admitted” by courts in trademark
cases and are “far more prevalent in trademark law than in most other areas [of
law].”45 Not all surveys are admitted: “Once the survey is admitted, however, followon issues of methodology, survey design, reliability, the experience and reputation of
the expert, critique of conclusions, and the like going to the weight of the survey rather
than its admissibility.”46
Although surveys are prevalent in trademark disputes, there are “ongoing
controversies that tend to complicate the question of whether survey evidence should

40 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 300-01 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing HMH
Publ’g Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974)).
41 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781-82 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(Explaining Congressman Lanham’s statement regarding the purposes underlying the trademark
statute. The purposes also included, “foster[ing] fair competition” and “secur[ing] to the business
community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion”).
42 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:22. See Uncommon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 825,
845 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“this case turns primarily on consumer perception of the parties’ products and
marks”).
43 G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1989).
44 Select Comfort Corp. v. Baxter, 156 F. Supp. 3d 971, 983 (D. Minn. 2016). See March Madness
Athletic Ass’n, LLC. v. Netfire, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 786, 803-04 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (The mark “March
Madness” describing basketball tournaments in March has acquired secondary meaning and is not a
generic mark because consumer surveys concluded that “the primary significance of March madness,
to members of the public . . . is a trade name relating to basketball.”), aff’d, 120 F. App’x 540 (5th Cir.
2005).
45 Schering Corp. v Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999). See Princeton Vanguard, LLC v.
Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Consumer surveys have become almost de
rigueur in litigation over genericness.”).
46 Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1263 (9th Cir. 2001). See Shire City
Herbals, Inc. v. Blue, 410 F. Supp. 3d 270, 289 (D. Mass. 2019) (surveys that “sampled an overbroad
population” have “limited, if any, probative value” for determining the genericness of “Fire Cider” for
herbal drinks); Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(surveys that had “serious flaws” such as questions that suggest the answers and questions being
based on a faulty premise were not helpful in determining whether “Pilates” is generic for a method
of exercise).
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be admitted.”47 The relevance of a survey will be undermined when “the term at issue
was regularly used before the plaintiff sought trademark protection.” 48 Surveys that
“[s]imply assert[] consumer awareness of the term begs the question” whether the term
is generic.49
D. Trademark Infringement & Likelihood of Confusion Standard
A trademark infringes on another if it is “likely to cause confusion.” 50 A likelihood
of confusion “exists between two marks if ‘the defendant’s actual practice is likely to
produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or services
in question.’”51 To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, each circuit
performs its own “non-exclusive” factor test, which usually include considering “the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark,” “the similarity of the two marks,” and “the similarity
of the goods or services that the marks identify.” 52 A “statutory affirmative defense” to
a trademark infringement claim is fair use. 53 Fair use demonstrates that “a junior user
is always entitled to use a descriptive term in good faith in its primary, descriptive
sense other than as a trademark.”54

47 Schering, 189 F.3d at 227. See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(consumer surveys given little weight, holding that “Hotels.com” is generic for services of providing
temporary lodging).
48 Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) (survey evidence was
irrelevant to determine whether “Brick Oven” for frozen pizza was generic because the term was
already commonly used “before either party began labeling their frozen pizzas”) (citing Miller Brewing
Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979)). See Hunt Masters, Inc. v.
Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 240 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Hunt does not claim to have
first coined the term ‘crab house.’ Therefore, it is not necessary to determine whether the term has
become generic through common use, rendering Hunt’s customer survey irrelevant.”).
49 Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales. Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir.
2001).
50 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
51 Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 158 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004)).
52 Compare Swatch, 739 F.3d at 158 (factors considered were (1) strength of the mark as actually
used in the marketplace; (2) similarity between the two marks to consumers; (3) similarity of the
goods; (4) similarity of the facilities used; (5) similarity of the advertising; (6) defendant’s intent; (7)
actual confusion; (8) quality of defendant’s product; and (9) sophistication of consuming public), with
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (factors considered were (1)
similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of goods or services; (3) similarity of trade channels; (4) buyers’
care; (5) fame of prior marks; (6) third party use of the mark on similar goods; (7) actual confusion; (8)
how long there has been concurrent use and no confusion; (9) variety of goods; (10) market interface;
(11) applicant’s right to exclude others from use of its mark; (12) the extent of potential confusion; and
(13) any other established fact probative of the effect of the use).
53 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
54 Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1257 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“The precise
elements of the classic fair use defense are that the defendant (1) is not using the term as a trademark,
(2) uses the term only to describe its goods and services, and (3) uses the term fairly and in good
faith.”).
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E. Composite Terms
Booking.com concerned a compound, or composite, term, which is when more than
one word is used.55 To determine the validity of a composite term, the Supreme Court
has stated that, “[t]he commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived from it as a
whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail.” 56 Therefore, “‘[w]ords
which could not individually become a trademark may become one when taken
together.’”57 When looking at a composite mark as a whole, a once descriptive term
may result in a generic combination with the addition of a generic term. 58
Both the majority opinion and dissenting opinion laboriously discuss Goodyear’s
Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.59 when determining trademark eligibility for
the mark in question. In Goodyear, the Supreme Court held that “‘Goodyear Rubber
Company’ is not one capable of exclusive appropriation” because “‘Goodyear Rubber’
are terms descriptive of well-known classes of goods produced by the process known as
‘Goodyear’s Invention’” and “[t]he addition of the word ‘Company’ only indicates that
parties have formed an association or partnership to deal in such goods, either to
produce or to sell them.”60 The Court further stated that “[n]ames of such articles
cannot be adopted as trade-marks . . . nor will the incorporation of a company in the
name of an article of commerce, without other specification, create any exclusive right
to the use of the name.”61
F. Domain Names
Finally, Booking.com discusses trademark eligibility for a mark ending in
“.com”.62 A domain name is “the Internet address of a Web site” also known as the
“‘uniform resource locator (url).’”63 A domain name consists of (1) a top level domain
name (“TLD”) and (2) a second level domain name (“SLD”), appearing to the left of the
top level domain name.64 The most common top level domain names are “.org,” “.net,”
“.gov,” and “.com,” with most United States firms preferring to use “.com” as its top

55 United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2020).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 11:27.
56 Ex Rel. P.D. Beckwith, Inc., v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1920).
57 Cal. Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976)).
58 See In re Ampco Foods, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 331 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (The mark “Russet
Fries” for “dehydrated potato mixtures for french frying” is a generic term and cannot be registered
on Principle Register). But see Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp.
2d 488, 495-96 (E.D. Va. 1999) (Although “The Speakers Bureau” is generic, the addition of
“Washington” to “Speakers Bureau” “converts the generic name to a descriptive mark”.).
59 128 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1888).
60 Id. at 602.
61 Id. at 603.
62 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2301.
63 6 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 22:38 (4th ed. 2020); 1 NEIL SMITH, INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 13:10 (2020).
64 2 VED P. NANDA ET AL., LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:31 (2020);
MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 25A:11.

[20:182 2021]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

190

level domain name.65 In “Booking.com,” “Booking” is the second level domain name and
“.com” is the top level domain name. When registering a domain name, because each
domain name is unique, if the requested domain name has already been assigned to
someone else, the applicant must choose a different one.66 At the close of the second
quarter in 2020, there were about 370.1 million domain name registrations across all
TLDs, an increase of about 3 million domain name registrations compared to the first
quarter of 2020.67 At the end of the second quarter of 2020, the largest TLD reported
to be “.com” with about 149 million reported domain names using that TLD. 68
Domain names are subject to the same restrictions as any other mark to
determine its eligibility for registration, therefore generic domain names are ineligible
and may not be registered.69 The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure states
that “when a trademark . . . is composed in whole or in part, of a domain name, neither
the beginning of the URL nor the TLD have any source-indicating significance.
Instead, those designations are merely devices that every Internet site provider must
use as part of its address.”70 Thus, the PTO usually argues that “.com” and other TLDs
do not add distinctiveness to the domain name to act as a trademark. 71 This principle
has been routinely used by courts when rejecting the eligibility of domain names if the
TLD is being added to an otherwise non-registerable, generic SLD.72

See MCCARTHY, supra note 16, §§ 25A:11 & 7:15.50; 1 SMITH, supra note 63, § 13:10; 2 NANDA
supra note 64, § 8:31.
66 Brookfield Comm., Inc. v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). The
organization responsible for checking the availability of a domain name and subsequent registration
is The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). See MCCARTHY, supra note
16, § 25A:12.
67 VERISIGN,
https://www.verisign.com/en_US/domainnames/dnib/index.xhtml?section=executive-summary (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
68 Id.
69 1 SMITH, supra note 63, § 13:12. See In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (holding that “Mattress.com” is generic); In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171,
1177 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“patents.com” is merely descriptive and ineligible for trademark registration).
70 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1215.02 (22nd ed. Oct. 2018).
71 Id.
72 See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “Hotels.com” is
generic because the separate terms “hotel” and “.com” “in combination have a meaning identical to
the common meaning of the separate components.”); Borescopes R U.S. v. 1800Endoscope.com, LLC,
728 F. Supp. 2d 938, 948-49 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (holding that www.borescopesrus.com is generic and
ineligible for registration); In re Reed Elsevier Prop. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“Lawyers.com”, a website providing interactive exchange of legal services and legal news is generic).
But see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that “Steelbuilding.com”
is not generic because “The addition of the TLD indicator expanded the meaning of the mark to include
internet services that include ‘building’ or designing steel structures”).
65

ET AL.,
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III. THE CASE

A. Facts & Procedural History
Booking.com is a digital company used for travel reservations with the domain
name of its website also being “Booking.com”. 73 Booking.com’s 2011 and 2012
trademark applications for “Booking.com” were refused.74 The PTO and TTAB deduced
that “Booking” means “making travel reservations” and “.com” “signifies a commercial
website.”75
Booking.com sought review in the United States District Court for the Eastern
Division of Virginia and introduced consumer surveys as new evidence of consumer
perception.76 Relying heavily on this evidence, the district court determined that
“Booking.com,” unlike “booking” is not generic because the “consuming
public . . . primarily understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus,
rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that domain name.” 77
“Booking.com,” according to the district court, is trademark eligible. 78
The PTO appealed the determination that “Booking.com” is not generic to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 79 The PTO argued that the
combination of “.com” with a generic term like “booking” is “necessarily generic.”80 The
Fourth Circuit rejected the PTO’s argument and affirmed the decision of the district
court.81 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision. 82
B. Supreme Court Decision
The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether “Booking.com,” taken as
a whole is generic.83 In order to resolve this issue, the Court concluded that it must
turn on whether “Booking.com” “signifies to consumers the class of online hotelreservation services.”84
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2303.
Id. See Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 177 (4th
Cir. 2019).
75 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2303. The PTO and TTAB determined that “Booking.com” is “generic
for the services at issue” and that “‘customers would understand the term BOOKING.COM primarily
to refer to an online reservation service for travel, tours, and lodgings.’”.
76 Id. The survey indicated that 74.8% of participants thought that “Booking.com” is a brand name
and 23.8% believed it was a generic name. Id. at 2313-14.
77 Id. at 2303. See Booking.com B.V v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 918 (2017).
78 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2303-04.
79 Id. at 2304.
80 Id. See Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 184 (4th
Cir. 2019).
81 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2304-05 In determining the genericness of “Booking.com”, the majority created an
analogy in which it said that “if ‘Booking.com’ were generic, we might expect consumers to understand
Travelocity—another such service—to be a ‘Booking.com.’”
73
74
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The majority recognized through the undisputed consumer surveys that
“Booking.com” is not generic because “Booking.com” is not a generic name to
consumers.85 The majority rejected the PTO’s suggested rule that when a generic term
is combined with a top-level domain like “.com,” (making “generic.com”) the resulting
combination is generic.86
In support of its argument, the PTO relied on Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg.
Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.87 It argued that “Generic.com” is comparable to “Generic
Company,” which was ineligible for trademark protection in Goodyear, because adding
“.com” to a generic term “conveys no additional meaning that would distinguish [one
provider’s] service from those of the other providers.”88
In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that “generic.com” terms are not
capable of signifying an entire class of online goods or services because only one entity
can occupy a particular internet domain name.89 Thus, consumers could understand a
“generic.com” term to refer to the singular website, which is not a class of goods or
services.90 The Court also used the PTO’s past practices to reject its argument, such as
accepting “DATING.COM” on the supplemental register. 91
The PTO argued that trademark protection for terms like “Booking.com” “would
hinder competitors” and “Booking.com” would monopolize similar language that
should be free to use.92 The PTO also argued that Booking.com has already “seized a
domain name that no other website can use and is easy for consumers to find.
Consumers might enter ‘the word “booking” in a search engine’ . . . or ‘proceed directly
to “booking.com” in the expectation that [online hotel-booking] services will be
offered.’”93
The Court explained that the likelihood of confusion doctrine would guard against
anticompetitive effects and prevent Booking.com from holding a monopoly on the term
“booking.”94 The Court recognized that Booking.com acknowledged that its mark is
weak, making it more difficult to show a likelihood of confusion and that the company
understands that close variations to its mark are unlikely to infringe. 95 The Court
concluded that the competitive advantages that Booking.com obtains in terms of its

Id. at 2305.
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305.
87 128 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1888).
88 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305-06. See Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co., 128 U.S. at
599-604. The Court held that “’Goodyear Rubber Company’ is not one capable of exclusive
appropriation” because “Goodyear Rubber” are descriptive terms and “[n]ames which are thus
descriptive of a class of goods cannot be exclusively appropriated by anyone.” In addition, including
the word “Company” at the end of a mark “only indicates that parties have formed an association or
partnership to deal in such goods” and does not “create any exclusive right to use the name of the
mark.” Thus, Goodyear Rubber Company did not have an exclusive right to use the purported mark
and Defendant, attempting to reach the public “to its own manufactured goods” could not be restrained
from use of its mark.
89 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305-06
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2305. See DATING.COM, Registration No. 2,580,467.
92 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307.
93 Id. at 2308.
94 Id. at 2307-08.
95 Id. at 2308.
85
86
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domain name does not automatically make the mark ineligible for trademark
protection.96
In making its final holding, the Court stated that whether a “generic.com” term is
generic, “depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a
class, or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing among members of the class.” 97
The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit that “Booking.com” is eligible for trademark
protection.98
C. Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote a powerful dissent discussing his legal and economic
concerns with the majority’s decision.99 Breyer applied the principle in Goodyear to
internet domain names in support of his argument that “Booking.com” is generic and
ineligible for trademark registration.100 Breyer argued that, “[w]hen a website uses an
inherently distinctive second-level domain . . . adding ‘.com’ merely denotes a website
associated with that term.”101 Thus, “Booking.com is no more and no less than a
website associated with its generic second-level domain, ‘booking.’” 102
Breyer also addressed concerns with the consumer surveys that were so heavily
relied upon in the lower courts.103 The majority stated that “only one entity can own
the rights to a particular domain name.”104 However, this is present in every
“generic.com” case and in order to prevent “automatic trademark eligibility for every
‘generic.com’ domain,” survey evidence could be relied upon.105 Breyer blamed
advertising as the reason why consumers identified “Booking.com” as a brand name
rather than a generic name and argued that, “[i]f someone were to start a company
called ‘Washingmachine.com,’ it could likely secure a similar level of consumer
identification by . . . advertising.”106 Breyer strongly doubted the reliability of the
consumer surveys because the surveys “tested consumers’ association of “Booking.com”
with a particular company, not anything about the term itself . . . such an association
does not establish that a term is nongeneric.”107

Id.
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307.
98 Id. at 2308-09.
99 Id. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 2311.
101 Id. at 2312.
102 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2312.
103 Id. at 2313.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2314. The survey showed that 33% of participants believed that “Washingmachine.com”
(a fictitious company) is a brand and 60.8% thought it was generic.
107 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2314 (Breyer explained that although the viewpoint that consumer
surveys are unreliable is the minority view, he believes it is the correct one and it is supported by case
law and a well-known trademark treatise); see MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 12:17.25; Kellogg Co. v.
Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1938); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
96
97
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Finally, Breyer feared that “granting trademark protection to ‘generic.com’ marks
threatens serious anticompetitive consequences in the online marketplace.” 108 Breyer
professed that, as a main principle in trademark law, “[t]erms that merely convey the
nature of the producer’s business should remain free for all to use.” 109 The “advantages
of doing business under a generic name . . . irrespective of the trademark laws” are
extensive.110 They include “less effort and expense educating consumers” due to generic
names being easy to remember, “immediately convey[ing] the nature of the business,”
and automatically creating “the impression that it is the most authoritative and
trustworthy source of the particular goods.” 111
Breyer discussed additional competitive advantages that are unique to the
internet.112 There can only be one “Booking.com” due to automatic, worldwide
exclusivity associated with domain name ownership.113 Generic domain names “are
easier for consumers to find” because the domain name is the type of good or service
they are looking for.114 Furthermore, the owner of a generic trademark is allowed to
“exclude others from using similar domain names [and] to threaten trademark
lawsuits against competitors.”115 Although in this case Booking.com argued that it
would not threaten competitors with lawsuits, “other firms may prove less
restrained.”116
Breyer contended that through the majority’s reasoning, “many businesses could
obtain a trademark by adding ‘.com’ to the generic name of their product.” 117
Consequently, Breyer sees a future economy “in an anticompetitive direction” and, at
the extreme, “that direction points towards one firm per product, the opposite of the
competitive mulitfirm marketplace that our basic economic laws seek to achieve.” 118
Breyer also concerned himself with the “threat of costly litigation [that] will no doubt
chill others from using variants on the registered mark and privilege established firms
over new entrants to the market.”119 Breyer concluded by stating his fear that the
majority’s decision “will lead to a proliferation of ‘generic.com’ marks, granting their
owners a monopoly over a zone of useful, easy-to-remember domains.” 120
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2314.
Id. at 2313.
110 Id. at 2314.
111 Id. (citing Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J 1323,
1337-1338 (1980)).
112 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2314.
113 Id. at 2314-15.
114 Id. at 2315.
115 Id. Examples given by Breyer of domain names that could threaten trademark lawsuits if used
by competitors include “Bookings.com,” “eBookings.com,” “Booker.com,” or “Bookit.com.”
116 Id.
117 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315.
118 Id. See also Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598,
603 (1888). The court stating in part that:
108
109

No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade-mark or trade-name
which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other than
those produced or made by himself. If he could, the public would be injured, rather
than protected, for competition would be destroyed.
119
120

Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315
Id. at 2315-16.
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. “Booking.com” is Generic
As a preliminary matter, the Court was incorrect in holding that “Booking.com”
is not generic.121 Holding that a compound term as a whole is generic that includes a
generic SLD and the TLD “.com” is not a novel pronouncement. There are various cases
in which terms similar in structure to “Booking.com” were deemed generic.122
In these instances, there was wide skepticism regarding the significance of the
TLD “.com” in a term.123 The skepticism was still present even while acknowledging
that “only one entity can hold a particular domain name,” 124 as the Booking.com
majority relied upon to support its conclusion that “.com” indicates a source identifying
characteristic.125 However, cases deciding the same issue as Booking.com determined
that “.com” simply “only indicates that the goods are available via the Internet.” 126
The majority’s reasoning that “generic.com” is not analogous to “Generic
Company” in its source identifying characteristics is flawed. Adding “Company,” or any
corporate designation, to the end of a term means that, “parties have formed an
association or partnership to deal in such goods.” 127 This does not aid in any source

Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305.
See Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“ADVERTISING.COM is generic. When any online advertising company, including AOL’s
competitors, is asked the question “what are you?” it would be entirely appropriate for the company
to respond “an advertising.com” or “an advertising dot-com.”); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d 1300, 1306
(2009) (“The Board’s finding that HOTELS.COM is generic was supported by substantial evidence.
The refusal of registration is affirmed.”); Borescopes R U.S. v. 1800Endoscope.com, LLC, 728 F. Supp.
2d, 938, 951 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he Court has determined [www.borescopesus.com] to be generic.”);
In re Meridian Rack & Pinion, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1467 (2015) (“[T]he meaning of the phrase
BUYAUTOPARTS.COM as a whole is generic for “’on-line retail store services featuring auto parts.’”);
In re Cyberfinancial.Net, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1794 (2002) (“Applicant seeks to register the
generic term ‘bonds,’ which has no source-identifying significance in connection with applicant’s
services, in combination with the top level domain indicator ‘.com,’ which also has no sourceidentifying significance.”); In re Reed Elsevier Prop. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1378 (2007) (Application for
“providing access to an online interactive database featuring information exchange in the field of law,
lawyers, legal news, and legal services” was generic); United Oil Heat, Inc. v. M.J. Meehan
Excavating, Inc., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 588 (2019) (“[T]he term OrderMyOil.com is a generic name
that answers the question, ‘What are you?’ The answer is, ‘A website where I may order my oil.’”).
123 See In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“’[c]onsumers would
see MATTRESS.COM and would immediately recognize it as a term that denotes a commercial
website rendering retail services featuring mattresses.’”); In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d
1171, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Regardless of the current state of Internet governance, the Board is
correct that the overall impression of ‘.com’ conveys to consumers the impression of a company or
commercial entity on the Internet.”); Meridian Rack, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1467 (“’.com’ is widely
understood and used to refer to a form of electronic commerce that allows consumers to purchase
goods or services online.”).
124 Advertise.com, 616 F.3d at 980.
125 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2306.
126 In re Eddie Zs Blinds & Drapery, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1037, 1038 (2005).
127 Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 602 (1888).
121
122
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identifying characteristics about the product or service–anyone could add “Company”
or “Incorporated” to the end of the proposed mark.
Similarly, adding a TLD simply means that the product or services are on a
website, which also does not aid in distinguishing the products or services among other
entities. Furthermore, every website requires a TLD and “.com” is the most popular
one among websites.128 A consumer would not know the identifying characteristics that
shows what goods are available only through “.com”; all they know is that the goods
are associated with a website.
When characterizing the strength of “Booking.com,” the majority relied on the fact
that every website is unique without considering that a TLD does not identify the
source of the goods.129 The majority also incorrectly distinguished between the TLD
“.com” and “Company” at the end of a mark because both of these do not differentiate
the goods from another source. Both of these terms indicate the nature of the business,
and Breyer correctly explained that, “terms that merely convey the nature of the
producer’s business should remain free for all the use.” 130 Because these terms should
remain free for all to use, it further supports the argument that they do not have any
trademark significance.
In previous cases, utilizing the dictionary was also an imperative step in
determining the genericness of a term with a “.com” TLD. 131 When determining
whether “Booking.com” is generic, the majority neglected to consider what the
everyday language of “Booking” entails. Instead, the majority relied heavily on
consumer surveys to determine whether consumers associated “Booking.com” as a
brand or a generic name.
Breyer correctly devalued these surveys in that they “tested consumers’
association of ‘Booking.com’ with a particular company, not anything about the term
itself.”132 “Booking.com” is an enormous company. With over 26,000 employees, as of
September 2020, Booking Holdings, the parent company of “Booking.com,” has a total
revenue of $15.1 billion with a market value of $60.6 billion. 133 Furthermore, it was

128 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 25A:11 (“Most commercial firms in the United States prefer to
use the top level domain ‘.com.’”); see Borescopes R U.S. v. 1800Endoscope.com, LLC, 728 F. Supp. 2d,
938, 947 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (“[E]ach website on the internet has a domain name, ‘which is an identifier
somewhat analogous to a telephone number or a street address.’”) (quoting Johnny’s Fine Foods, Inc.
v. Johnny’s Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 876, 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2003)).
129 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2306.
130 Id. at 2313. See Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 604 (1888)
(“The designation ‘Goodyear Rubber Company’ not being subject to exclusive appropriation, any use
of terms of similar import, or any abbreviation of them, must be alike free to all persons.”).
131 See In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]f the compound
word would plainly have no different meaning from its constituent words, and dictionaries, or other
evidentiary sources, establish the meaning of those words to be generic, then the compound word too
has been proved generic.”); In re DNI Holdings Ltd., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1440 (2005) (“[D]ictionary
definitions show that ‘sports betting’ is the equivalent of ‘sports wagering’ . . . We have no doubt but
that joining the separate words ‘sports’ and ‘betting’ creates a term that, in context, would be generic
for a service that permits one to wager on sporting events.”); In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The TTAB started its analysis with dictionary . . . definitions of ‘hotel,’
‘temporary lodging,’ and ‘.com.’”).
132 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2314.
133 Booking Holdings, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/companies/booking/#430c02a94c69 (last
visited Feb. 6, 2020); Andrea Murphy, Hank Tucker, Marley Coyne & Halah Touryalai, Global 2000

[20:182 2021]

Trademark Law After USPTO V. Booking.com:
“Generic.com” Takeover

197

ranked number 369 in Forbes’ Global 2000 list, ranking the world’s 2,000 largest public
companies.134 Taking these statistics into consideration, it is clear why the surveys
indicated that 74.8% of the participants thought that “Booking.com” is a brand because
so many people have heard of “Booking.com” through its immense advertising and
prominent presence in the marketplace.135 That consumers have heard of
“Booking.com” should not automatically mean that it is not generic. The strong
presence of “Booking.com” in the marketplace skewed the survey results and created
an illusory indication that consumers do not associate “Booking.com” as generic.
Regardless of what the surveys indicate, the term is still one that “connotes the basic
nature of that thing—the hallmark of a generic term.” 136
The definition of the verb “book” is: “to register (something, such as a name) for
some future activity or condition (as to engage in transportation or reserve lodgings),”
and “to reserve in advance.”137 Furthermore, the definition of “Booking” is: “the act of
one that books.”138 The majority did not see the significance that “Booking.com” is an
online booking service; however, this is crucial in proving that “Booking.com” is
generic. Breyer correctly concluded that, “[t]he company’s name informs the consumer
of the basic nature of its business.”139 The website itself even mentions on its homepage
that it is “[t]he World’s #1 Choice for Booking Accommodations.” 140 Relying on skewed
consumer surveys and the website admitting that it provides booking services, the
majority’s conclusion that “Booking.com” is not generic was incorrect. “Booking.com”

The
World’s
Largest
Public
Companies,
FORBES
(May
13,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/global2000/#4bdefa60335d [hereinafter Global 2000].
134 Global 2000, supra note 133.
135 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2313-14. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118
(1938) (“The evidence shows only that due to the long period in which the plaintiff or its predecessor
was the only manufacturer of the product, many people have come to associate the product, and as a
consequence the name by which the product is generally known, with the plaintiff.”); Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2nd Cir. 1976). The court expresses one reason why,
regardless of a generic term’s prominence in the market, a generic term cannot be afforded trademark
protection:
[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into
promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing
public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of
the right to call an article by its name.
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2312.
Book, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/book (last visited
Oct. 18, 2020).
138 Booking, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/booking (last
visited Oct. 18, 2020).
139 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2309.
140 BOOKING.COM, https://www.booking.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). See also HOTELS.COM,
https://www.hotels.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). HOTELS.COM, which was denied federal
registration because it was considered generic, does not have any type of catch-phrase or promotional
advertisement that they are a hotel service. It would seem counterintuitive that BOOKING.COM, who
openly promotes that they sell booking services was eligible for federal registration, while
HOTELS.COM that does not include this type of language, was denied eligibility.
136
137
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is the sum of its constituent parts—an online provider of booking and the relevant
public would understand the mark this way.141
B. Economic Anti-Competitive Effects
Allowing “Booking.com” to obtain federal trademark registration would be a
detriment to an economy that promotes competition and would negate the purpose of
trademark law. Breyer argued that if “generic.com” marks are eligible for federal
trademark protection, as the internet grows, the online economy would eventually, at
the extreme, equate to “one firm per product,”142 meaning that each “generic.com”
mark would be a monopoly over the product or service it provides. Just as the
hypothetical from the Introduction illustrates, “Candles.com” would encompass the
entire online market for candles just as “Booking.com” would encompass that of online
booking. Unfortunately, this hypothetical might become a reality in the near future if
the majority’s decision is upheld. This decision might fundamentally reorient our
economy by destroying the possibility of competition in some, many, or most sectors.
“Booking.com” is already on its way to a monopoly in the online booking services
as is apparent from a simple Google search of the word “Booking.” When searching
“Booking,” not only is the first page of results flooded with links to “Booking.com” and
information about “Booking.com,”143 but the “News” section is flooded with articles
about “Booking.com,”144 and the majority of the results in the “Images” section are
logos and advertisements for “Booking.com.”145 Thus, “Booking.com” already receives
essentially all of the online bookings business from consumers due to the easy access
of its site through a simple internet search. 146
The current anti-competitive nature of “Booking.com” is heightened due to its
federal trademark protection. Now, not only is “Booking.com” the internet leader for
online booking services, but they have the right to threaten to exclude possible
141 See In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Because websites
operate under the term ‘mattress.com’ to provide mattresses, and they provide them online, the Board
properly concluded that the relevant public understands the mark MATTRESS.COM to be no more
than the sum of its constituent parts, an online provider of mattresses.”).
142 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315.
143 GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Aron Meystedt, Domain Names: There’s Value in Those URLs, INTELLIGENT COLLECTOR,
https://intelligentcollector.com/domain-names-theres-value-in-those-urls/ (last visitied Oct. 18, 2020).
The author states the following when discussing the advantages a category-defining domain name
offers its owners:

[C]ategory-defining domain name offers several advantages for companies
operating on the Internet [including]: [t]he ability to rank higher on search
engines . . . A moat against the entry of other potential entrants . . . [and] [t]he
ability to advertise a single URL and convey exactly what business your company
operates.
Matt Southern, Over 25% of People Click the First Google Search Result, SEARCH ENGINE JOURNAL
(July 14, 2020), https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-first-page-clicks/374516/#close (“It’s
well known users rarely venture into the second page of search results.”).
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competitors with a similar domain name.147 The majority asserted that “Booking.com”
has said they would not threaten litigation against owners of domain names similar to
“Booking.com.”148 However, the majority did not give considerable weight to how
owners of other “generic.com” marks might act if exposed to a potential competitor with
a similar name—how “Booking.com” alleges they would act is not informative of how
others will act if in the same situation.
The majority argued that the owner of a “generic.com” mark might not prevail in
litigation due to a lack of consumer confusion or a showing of fair use by the alleged
infringer.149 However, the majority failed to recognize that awarding “Booking.com”
federal trademark eligibility, allowing them rights to litigate, advances its monopoly
over the services and continues to promote an anti-competitive economy. Even before
litigation ensues, if the owner of a federally registered “Generic.com” mark contacts a
possible infringer, it is more likely that the threat of litigation would cause the
potential infringer to cease to exist. As a new entity in the online booking service
market, the intimidation from “Booking.com,” the “World’s #1 Choice for Booking
Accommodations,”150 might cause the less-developed startup entity to reconsider its
business model. As a new entity in the market, “the threat of costly litigation will no
doubt chill others from using variants on the registered mark and privilege established
firms over new entrants to the market.”151 Therefore, even if the litigation would have
been unsuccessful, the larger firm owners of “Generic.com” would advance its
monopoly and lessen the “competitive multifirm marketplace that our basic economic
laws seek to achieve.”152
Upholding this case will also cause negative effects on the efficiency of applying
for a federally recognized trademark. Although the majority mentioned a few instances
where the PTO awarded federal registration on trademark applications that looked
similar in structure to “Booking.com,”153 the majority disregarded all of the cases
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315 (“Federal registration would
allow respondent to threaten trademark lawsuits against competitors using domains such as
‘Bookings.com,’ ‘eBooking.com,’ ‘Booker.com,’ or ‘Bookit.com.’”).
148 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2308.
149 Id.
150 BOOKING.COM, supra note 140.
151 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315. See Robert G. Bone, Rights and Remedies in Trademark Law:
The Curious Distinction Between Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition, 98 TEX. L. REV.
1187, 1187 (2020) (“The high litigation costs and risks of trademark cases can chill socially desirable
uses, such as uses of product features to compete, uses of marks for expressive purposes, and
innovative uses of marks on the internet.”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Two-Tiered Trademarks, 56 HOUS.
L. REV. 295, 304, 321-22 (2018) (“outcomes today in the trademark system depend, and sometimes
depend almost entirely, on the respective wealth of the parties.”).
152 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315.
153 Id. at 2305 (These trademarks include “ART.COM” on the principal register for “online retail
store services” offering art and “DATING.COM” on the supplemental register for dating services); see
also In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) The court states:

The STEELBUILDING.COM web site thus includes more than a mere shopping
guide for metal building structures. As the program-user develops the design, the
program re-calculates design elements as necessary to meet codes and other
engineering requirements . . . The purchaser can compare prices of different
designs, and finally purchase a preferred design. Therefore . . . the Board fails to
acknowledge the interactive design feature of the applicant’s goods and services.
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where the PTO, and even the courts, denied federal registration. The majority decision
created inconsistency among the Court and the PTO regarding how to deal with
“Generic.com” marks.154 The majority decision will overwhelm the TTAB with a flood
of appeals from those instances where marks were denied registration that are
structurally identical to “Booking.com.” The inconsistencies will create confusion
among courts on whether to rely on the Booking.com majority or the traditions of the
PTO.
V. CONCLUSION
The consequences of adhering to the holding of Booking.com would be catastrophic
to the future of trademark law. If the generic mark “Booking.com” is permitted to
obtain federal trademark registration, it will create a future trademark world of
“generic.com” marks. This future would be detrimental to the core concepts of
trademark law, namely, promoting competition to benefit consumers.155 Because of this
decision, there is nothing stopping any generic trademark owner who has been denied
federal registration from creating a website and adding “.com” to the mark. Relying on
Booking.com as support would permit the previously denied mark to obtain
registration. As previously denied “generic.com” marks become eligible for federal
registration, each generic mark will obtain a monopoly over the product or service it

154 See Ann K. Linnehan, Need Trademark Protection for a Generic Domain Name?, 38 GONZ. L.
REV. 503, 523 (2003). Linnehan, a Trademark Attorney for the PTO re-iterates the PTO’s stance on
the significance of domain names regarding trademark protection when she said:

To attain protection as a trademark, the domain name must be more than just a
web site locator. It must also act as an identifier of the origin of the goods or
services . . . The USPTO states that a mark composed of a generic term and a toplevel domain will be refused registration because the mark is generic and the toplevel domain has no trademark significance . . . the TTAB appears to have adopted
the USPTO’s position on generic domain names.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 7:17.50 (In his Author’s Opinion discussing the Booking.com Fourth
Circuit Court of appeals case (915 F.3d 171 (2019)), McCarthy says:
Discarding the predictable and clear line rule of the U.S.P.T.O. and the Federal
Circuit creates a nebulous and unpredictable zone of generic name and top level
domain combinations that somehow become protectable marks when accompanied
by favorable survey results . . . The Fourth Circuit decision raises a host of
challenging infringement questions, such as whether a federally registered mark
BOOKING.COM is infringed by hypothetical marks such as: hotelbooking.com;
seasidebooking.com, booking.vacations or booking.hotels.
155 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine
prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from
instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.
It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a
monopoly.”) (emphasis added); MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:1 (“there is also the policy of encouraging
competition from which the public benefits.”).
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sells, just as Justice Breyer feared.156 It is just a matter of time before Booking.com
obtains a monopoly over the term “Booking” and the other generic terms will soon
follow on its footsteps. As more generic terms are claimed by one entity, consumers
will not be benefited due to the lack of options.157 The internet as the medium for
monopolies to conduct their business further discourages consumers from knowing
what other sources are available.158
The majority in Booking.com made two mistakes in its analysis: it incorrectly
concluded that “Booking.com” is not generic and it incorrectly determined that there
were no threats to the economy by holding “Booking.com” eligible for federal trademark
protection. However, analysis regarding what the future of trademark law will look
like if this case is upheld is frightening. The economic threats of trademark law that
follows from Booking.com strongly suggest that this case needs to be overturned. The
majority opinion in Booking.com did not carefully consider the effect that granting
federal registration eligibility to one mark would have on all the structurally similar
marks that were once denied registration nor the effect it will have on the economy on
the years to come.

156 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2315-16. See MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:12 (“A trademark
precludes the idea of a monopoly. It is a means of distinguishing one product from another; it follows
therefore that there must be others to distinguish from.”) (quoting Edward S. Rogers, Goodwill,
Trademarks and Unfair Trading 51 (1914).
157 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademarks and the Internet: The United States’ Experience, 97
TRADEMARK REP. 931, 932 (2007) (“Consumers . . . are intensely interested in competition and the
lower prices it can bring.”).
158 See Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2004) (“Internet-related trademark cases has seriously eroded
these substantive [trademark rules], to the point where trademark law’s anticompetitive tendencies
threaten to overwhelm its information-facilitating function in some contexts.”); Michael S. Denniston
& Margaret Smith Kubiszyn, WWW.YOURCLIENT.COM: Choosing Domain Names and Protecting
Trademarks on the Internet, 61 ALA. LAW. 40, 41 (2000) (“A business’s home page on the World Wide
Web can provide information about the business and the goods and services it provides to a virtually
unlimited audience at a relatively low cost.”).

